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Abstract
It is common for firms to forecast stationary demand using simple exponential smoothing due
to the ease of computation and understanding of the methodology. In this paper we show that
the use of this methodology can be extremely costly in the context of inventory in a two-stage
supply chain when the retailer faces AR(1) demand. We show that under the myopic order-up-to
level policy, a retailer using exponential smoothing may have expected inventory-related costs
more than ten times higher than when compared to using the optimal forecast. We demonstrate
that when the AR(1) coefficient is less than the exponential smoothing parameter, the supplier’s
expected inventory-related cost is less when the retailer uses optimal forecasting as opposed to
exponential smoothing. We show there exists an additional set of cases where the sum of the
expected inventory-related costs of the retailer and the supplier is less when the retailer uses
optimal forecasting as opposed to exponential smoothing even though the supplier’s expected
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cost is higher. In this paper, we study the impact on the naive retailer, the sophisticated
supplier, and the two-stage chain as a whole of the supplier sharing its forecasting expertise
with the retailer. We provide explicit formulas for the supplier’s demand and the mean squared
forecast errors for both players under various scenarios.
1 Introduction
It is common for firms to forecast stationary demand using simple exponential smoothing for
inventory control (see for example Nahmias 2015, p. 853) due to the ease of computation and
understanding of the methodology. In this paper, we examine the impact of using this convenient
forecasting procedure on inventory in supply chains. To do so, we consider a two-stage supply chain
with a naive retailer that faces AR(1) demand but uses exponential smoothing for forecasting even
though this yields suboptimal forecasts. We study the impact on the retailer, the supplier (assumed
to be more sophisticated), and the chain as a whole of the supplier sharing its forecasting expertise
with the retailer.
There has been much research on the value of information sharing in supply chains when the
retailer faces AR (autoregressive) or ARMA (autoregressive moving average) demand. In their
seminal paper, Lee, So, and Tang (2000) studied the value of information sharing in a two-stage
supply chain where both players use the myopic order-up-to level policy and the retailer faces an
AR(1) demand with positive AR coefficient. They concluded that there is always value to the
supplier of the retailer sharing its demand. Raghunathan (2001) showed that in this case, the
supplier is always able to infer the retailer’s demand and hence there is no value to information
sharing. Zhang (2004), Gaur, Giloni, and Seshadri (2005) hereafter referred to as GGS, and Giloni,
Hurvich, and Seshadri (2014) (GHS hereafter) studied the more general ARMA demand case which
included AR(1) demand with a negative AR(1) coefficient. Zhang assumed that the shock sequence
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in the retailer’s order to the supplier would be observable to the supplier and hence concluded that
there is no value to information sharing. GGS showed that when the AR(1) coefficient is less than
−.5, the supplier is unable to recover the retailer’s demand. GHS determined when there is value to
information sharing (for example, the case discussed above), assuming that all players use optimal
forecasts. In this framework, they also studied the propagation of demand (ARMA-in ARMA-
out) up the supply chain with and without sharing of shocks. In this stream of research, the only
information sharing considered is the retailer sharing demand information with the supplier. Others
have studied environments where the retailer and/or the supplier can share demand information
with each other. For example, Shnaiderman and El Ouardighi (2014) assumed that the retailer
observes AR(1) demand where the random component of the retailer’s demand is a function of both
the retailer’s and the supplier’s information. They studied when it is beneficial for either player to
share information with the other and when information sharing might be detrimental to a player.
In this paper, we consider the value to the retailer and the supplier of the supplier sharing
its forecasting expertise in a two-stage supply chain. We assume that the retailer, for the sake of
convenience, uses the widely available simple exponential smoothing method to forecast its demand.
This creates a potential disconnect between the true mechanism generating demand (which we
assume to be AR(1)) and the forecasting methodology. Indeed, unless the retailer’s demand was
generated by an ARIMA(0,1,1) model, the exponential smoothing forecast will be suboptimal. On
the other hand, we assume that the supplier is sufficiently sophisticated in modeling and data
analysis that the supplier, given a sufficiently long history of the retailer’s orders, is able to infer
the true ARMA model generating the retailer’s order process. We prove (see Remark 1) that the
supplier is then able to infer the retailer’s demand as well as its AR(1) generating mechanism,
and also the exponential smoothing parameter used by the retailer. Therefore, the supplier is in
possession of expertise that would benefit the retailer.
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Indeed, the retailer is always benefited by the use of the optimal forecast. However, as a result
of the supplier sharing its forecasting expertise, we show that the demand the supplier will face
can have a smaller or larger mean squared forecast error (MSFE) than when the retailer uses the
suboptimal exponential smoothing forecast. We assume that the supplier will share its forecasting
expertise when it benefits the supplier or when it benefits the chain as a whole (where the benefits
will be shared equally between both players).
If the supplier provides its forecasting expertise to the retailer, there may be value in the
retailer sharing its demand with the supplier. Specifically, we show that once the supplier shares
its expertise with the retailer, who therefore now uses optimal forecasts, the supplier may no longer
be able to recover the retailer’s demand. In such a case, the supplier will benefit from the retailer
sharing its demand with the supplier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setting
of our two-stage supply chain in detail. In Section 3, we carry out a simulation study to gauge
the inventory costs of the retailer, the supplier, and the whole supply chain. We consider different
parameter configurations in the simulation and show cases where the supplier is better off by sharing
its expertise with the retailer in terms of a lower inventory cost for itself or the whole chain and that
the retailer always benefits if it uses the optimal forecast. In Section 4, we derive the retailer’s order
process based on its suboptimal (exponential smoothing) and optimal (AR(1)) forecast as well as
the MSFE of these forecasts. We assume that the supplier has sufficient expertise to identify the
form, model degree and coefficients of the retailer’s order process correctly. We derive the MSFE
of the supplier’s best linear forecast under the two different retailer order processes. We present
concluding remarks in Section 5.
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2 Problem Setup
We consider a two-stage supply chain where there is one retailer and one supplier. Both players
use the myopic order-up-to level policy to determine their inventory positions and hence their order
quantities. We assume that the retailer’s leadtime is `1 periods and that the supplier’s leadtime
is `2 periods. We assume that both players have a holding cost per unit per unit time of h and
shortage cost per unit per unit time of s. At time t, the retailer observes its demand and then
places an order with its supplier according to the myopic order-up-to level policy. In other words,
the retailer’s order-up-to-level at time t is
S1,t = m1,t + c
√
ν1 (1)
where ν1 is the MSFE of m1,t, the retailer’s forecast of demand over the leadtime t+ 1 to t+ 1 + `1
based on its past and present demand at time t
m1,t =
l1+1∑
i=1
Dˆ1,t+i, (2)
Dˆ1,t+i is the retailer’s forecast of demand at time t+ i based on D1,t, D1,t−1, . . . and c = Φ−1( ss+h)
(where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function) is the fractile based upon
service level ss+h and the distribution of the retailer’s demand shocks.
The retailer’s order to the supplier, D2,t, is therefore equal to the current observed demand plus
the order-up-to level at time t minus the order up-to level at time t − 1 (see Lee, So, and Tang
2000, Equation (3.1)),
D2,t = D1,t + S1,t − S1,t−1 = D1,t +m1,t −m1,t−1 (3)
where the right hand side holds since the mean squared forecast error is time invariant. We refer
the supplier’s forecast of its demand over the leadtime t+ 1 to t+ 1 + `2 as m2,t.
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In this paper, we assume that the retailer’s demand {D1,t} follows a stationary AR(1) process
with the representation
D1,t = d+ φD1,t−1 + true1,t (4)
where d is a constant, |φ| < 1, and {true1,t } are the retailer’s true shocks, which are Gaussian white
noise with mean zero and variance σ21 . We are interested in studying how the value of φ in the
retailer’s demand model impacts its forecast of demand under exponential smoothing and hence
how demand propagates upstream. To do so, we consider two forecasting methods used by the
retailer. In the first case, the retailer uses exponential smoothing (DˆESt+i given by Equations (16)
and (35)). In the second case, upon the supplier providing forecasting expertise, the retailer uses
the optimal forecast for its AR(1) demand (DˆARt+i given by Equation (45)). We use Equation (3) to
obtain the retailer’s order to the supplier when the retailer uses exponential smoothing. We then
determine the expected cost for the retailer when using exponential smoothing and the expected
cost for the supplier whose demand is based upon the retailer’s use of exponential smoothing.
Finally, we compare the above to the case when the retailer uses the optimal forecast.
When the retailer uses exponential smoothing, we refer to its forecast over the leadtime as mES1,t ,
its mean squared forecast error as νES1 , and forecast for demand at time t + i as Dˆ
ES
1,t+i. When
optimal forecasting is used, we replace the superscript ES by AR. Even though we provide the
theoretical mean squared forecast error for a retailer using exponential smoothing (see Proposition
7), such a naive retailer would presumably not be able to derive this quantity. Instead, we assume
that such a retailer would estimate this value by using the sample variance of its forecast errors
over the leadtime, which converges to the true MSFE.
We define the following terms used in this paper:
• mES2,t : supplier’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime when it faces demand
{
DES2,t
}
,
i.e. the retailer uses exponential smoothing to forecast its demand.
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• mAR,S2,t : supplier’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime when it faces demand
{
DAR2,t
}
,
i.e. the retailer uses the optimal forecast to predict its demand, and the supplier is able to infer the
retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
or the retailer shares its demand shocks with the supplier.
•mAR,NS2,t : supplier’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime when it faces demand
{
DAR2,t
}
and is not able to infer the retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
, and the retailer does not share
its demand with the supplier.
• νES2 : MSFE of the supplier’s best linear forecast when the retailer uses exponential smoothing
to forecast its demand.
• νAR,S2 : MSFE of the supplier’s best linear forecast when the retailer uses the optimal forecast to
predict its demand and the supplier is able to infer the retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
, or
the retailer shares its demand shocks with the supplier.
• νAR,NS2 : MSFE of the supplier’s best linear forecast when the retailer uses the optimal forecast
to predict its demand and the supplier is unable to infer the retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
.
3 Inventory and Cost Implications of Exponential Smoothing
Both the retailer and the supplier want to minimize their own inventory-related costs. Let SES1,t
denote the retailer’s order-up-to level at time t if it adopts the suboptimal forecast and SAR1,t the
retailer’s order-up-to at time t if it adopts the optimal forecast At time t, the retailer’s actual
inventory cost in period t+ `1 + 1 is given by
ICES1,t =
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − SES1,t
)+
s+
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − SES1,t
)−
h (5)
if the retailer uses exponential smoothing for its forecast and
ICAR1,t =
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − SAR1,t
)+
s+
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − SAR1,t
)−
h (6)
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if the retailer uses the optimal forecast. Following Lee, So, and Tang (2000) (see their Equation
(4.7) and the surrounding discussion), we assume that the retailer, at time t, wishes to determine
the value of S1,t to minimize its conditional expected inventory cost
E

(`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − S1,t
)+
s+
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i − S1,t
)−
h
 ∣∣∣∣∣M1t
 (7)
where M1t is retailer’s available information at time t. Lee, So and Tang (2000) justified the
order-up-to level (minimizing Equation (7))
S∗1,t = m
∗
1,t + Φ
−1(
s
s+ h
)
√
ν∗1 (8)
where m∗1,t is the best linear forecast of leadtime demand and ν∗1 is the MSFE of m∗1,t. Since we
assume that the retailer faces AR(1) demand, m∗1,t = mAR1,t , and ν∗1 = νAR1 .
As in Lee, So, and Tang (2000) (LST hereafter; see their Equation (4.8) and the discussion
that precedes it), we assume that when the retailer uses a suboptimal forecast m1,t with MSFE
ν1, it will replace m
∗
1,t with m1,t and ν
∗
1 with ν1 in Equation (8). In the context of this paper, the
suboptimal forecast is mES1,t with corresponding MSFE ν
ES
1 . In this section, we study the effect of
the retailer’s use of exponential smoothing on its inventory cost. We also consider the impact on
the supplier of the retailer using exponential smoothing.
Consider the loss function
L(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(z − x)dΦ(z) (9)
where Φ(z) is the standard normal CDF. The retailer’s optimal conditional expected cost in Propo-
sition 1 below can be found in Equation (4.7) of LST. We include the proposition and its proof (in
the Appendix) in our paper since they both are important for the other results in this section.
Proposition 1 The retailer’s optimal conditional expected cost is
√
ν∗1
[
(s+ h)L
(
Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
+ hΦ−1
(
s
s+ h
)]
. (10)
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In the case where the retailer uses exponential smoothing, before we consider the conditional
expected cost, we first discuss the conditional service level defined as P
(∑`1+1
i=1 Dt+i < S
ES
1,t |M1t
)
.
Proposition 2 If the retailer uses the myopic order-up-to policy based on the exponential smooth-
ing forecast, the retailer’s conditional service level is given by Φ(r) where
r =
mES1,t −m∗1,t + Φ−1( ss+h)
√
νES1√
ν∗1
. (11)
Proof : The retailer’s conditional service level under exponential smoothing is given by (where Z
is standard normal conditionally on M1t )
P
(
`1+1∑
i=1
Dt+i < S
ES
1,t |M1t
)
= P
(∑`1+1
i=1 Dt+i −m∗1,t√
ν∗1
<
SES1,t −m∗1,t√
ν∗1
∣∣∣∣∣M1t
)
= P
Z < mES1,t + Φ−1
(
s
s+h
)√
νES1 −m∗1,t√
ν∗1
∣∣∣∣∣M1t

= P
(
Z < r|M1t
)
= Φ(r). (12)
Note that when the retailer uses the optimal forecast, the service level is equal to ss+h . Therefore,
the conditional service level is always equal to ss+h . However, Proposition 2 implies that when the
retailer uses the exponential smoothing forecast, the retailer’s conditional service level is the random
quantity Φ(r), which in general will not be equal to the desired ss+h .
The retailer’s conditional expected cost under a suboptimal forecast is also discussed by LST
in their Equation (4.9). We provide the retailer’s conditional expected cost under exponential
smoothing in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 If the retailer uses the myopic order-up-to policy with the exponential smoothing
forecast, the retailer’s conditional expected cost is
√
ν∗1 [(s+ h)L(r) + hr]. (13)
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To demonstrate the effect of exponential smoothing on the retailer’s conditional service level and its
conditional expected cost, we simulated 1000 different paths of AR(1) processes up to time t = 100.
For each of the 1000 paths, we simulated 10000 possible values of D1,101. We then computed the
proportion of the 10000 realizations where the retailer would satisfy its leadtime demand using a
myopic order-up-to-policy with h = 1 and s = 9 based upon an exponential smoothing forecast.
We show the distribution of the retailer’s conditional service level, Φ(r), in Figure 1. It can be
seen that the retailer’s conditional service level is random and there are a non-negligible number of
observations where Φ(r) is less than the desired service level 0.9. In addition, for each of the 1000
paths, we computed the retailer’s average inventory cost across the 10000 realizations and graphed
it against the retailer’s conditional service level. The bottom plot of Figure 1 shows a U-shaped
curve of the retailer’s conditional expected inventory cost versus its conditional service level. The
minimum inventory cost occurs at service level 0.9. These graphs demonstrate that the exponential
smoothing forecast when used within a myopic order-up-to policy will often cause the retailer to
either overshoot or undershoot its optimal service level and thus drive up its conditional expected
inventory cost.
Although the myopic-order-up-to policy is focused on minimizing the conditional expected cost,
a manager is likely to measure the effectiveness of his inventory policy by considering the long-run
average inventory cost per period. We analyze this (unconditional) expected cost for the retailer
under optimal forecasting as well as under exponential smoothing. We define EICES1 = E
[
ICES1,t
]
and EICAR1 = E
[
ICAR1,t
]
. Since by Proposition 1 the conditional expected cost under the optimal
policy is not random, EICAR1 =
√
ν∗1 [(s + h)L(Φ
−1( ss+h)) + hΦ
−1( ss+h)]. We next present the
retailer’s expected cost under exponential smoothing. As far as we are aware this result has not
been explicitly presented in previous literature.
Proposition 4 If the retailer uses the myopic order-up-to policy based on the exponential smooth-
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ing forecast, the retailer’s expected cost is
EICES1 =
√
νES1
[
(s+ h)L
(
Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
+ hΦ−1
(
s
s+ h
)]
. (14)
We next consider the supplier’s problem. A proof very similar to that of Proposition 1 shows
that the supplier’s optimal conditional expected cost is given by
√
ν∗2
[
(s+ h)L
(
Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
+ hΦ−1
(
s
s+ h
)]
, (15)
where ν∗2 is defined below. As discussed previously, we assume that the supplier always uses optimal
forecasting. Nevertheless, the demand it observes depends upon the forecasting method used by the
retailer as well as the demand sharing arrangement between the retailer and supplier. The quantity
ν∗2 in Equation (15) is given by νES2 (when the retailer uses exponential smoothing to forecast its
demand), or by νAR,S2 (when the retailer uses the optimal forecast to predict its demand and the
supplier is able to infer the retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
, or the retailer shares its demand
shocks with the supplier), or by νAR,NS2 (when the retailer uses the optimal forecast to predict its
demand, the supplier is unable to infer the retailer’s demand shocks from
{
DAR2,t
}
and the retailer
does not share its demand shocks with the supplier).
Similarly, the expected total cost of the supply chain when the retailer uses exponential smooth-
ing is given by TCES = EICES1 + EIC
ES
2 . The expected total cost of the supply chain when the
retailer uses optimal forecasting and the retailer shares its demand shocks or the supplier is able to
infer them is given TCCS = EICAR1 +EIC
AR,S
2 . Finally, the expected total cost of the supply chain
when the retailer uses optimal forecasting and the retailer does not share its demand shocks and the
supplier is not able to infer the retailer’s demand shocks is given TCCNS = EICAR1 + EIC
AR,NS
2 .
It is clear that the retailer will have a lower expected inventory cost when using optimal fore-
casting as opposed to exponential smoothing. It can be seen that this is due to the retailer having
a larger MSFE in Equation (14) than in Equation (10) since the equations are identical otherwise.
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It is not clear whether or not the supplier would benefit from the retailer using optimal forecasting.
Furthermore, if the supplier shares its forecasting expertise with the retailer, the supplier may not
be able to recover the retailer’s demand shocks (see Remark 2 in Section 4). Finally, even if the
supplier does not directly benefit from the retailer’s use of optimal forecasting, the chain as a whole
may be better off (the retailer and supplier can split the reduction in cost).
To better understand how the forecasting approach used by the retailer can affect the cost
structure of the supply chain, we consider a supply chain where the retailer and supplier both
have unit holding and shortage costs of 1 and 9 respectively. Below, we provide graphs that help
demonstrate the benefits and/or consequences of the supplier sharing its forecasting expertise so
the retailer can use optimal forecasting.
In Figure 2, we graph the ratio of the retailer’s expected cost under exponential smoothing to
optimal forecasting where α = .45 and `1 = 6. This graph demonstrates that the retailer’s expected
cost can be more than 10 times higher when it uses exponential smoothing as opposed to optimal
forecasting. In Figure 3, we show the regions where the supplier’s expected cost is higher if the
retailer uses exponential smoothing as opposed to optimal forecasting. It can be seen that whenever
φ < α, the supplier is benefited by the retailer using optimal forecasting. For larger values of `2, the
region where the supplier has a higher expected cost under the retailer using optimal forecasting
(as opposed to exponential smoothing) becomes smaller.
In Figure 4, we show the regions where the chain as a whole is better off under the retailer using
optimal forecasting as opposed to exponential smoothing. In Figure 4, we assume that the retailer
has shared its demand shocks when beneficial to the supplier. It can be seen that whenever φ < α,
the chain is benefited by the retailer using optimal forecasting. For larger values of `2, the region
when the chain has a higher expected cost under the retailer using optimal forecasting (as opposed
to exponential smoothing) becomes smaller. When φ is close to 1 and α is close to 0, the chain is
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also better off when the retailer uses optimal forecasting.
In Figure 5, the green shaded region is where the supplier is better off under the retailer using
optimal forecasting and hence the chain as a whole is better off. The red shaded region is where the
chain as a whole is better off under the retailer using optimal forecasting although the supplier is
better off when the retailer uses exponential smoothing. The blue shaded region is where the chain
is worse off when the retailer uses optimal forecasting as opposed to exponential smoothing. In
Figure 5, we assume that the retailer has shared its demand shocks where beneficial to the supplier.
In Figure 6, we graph the ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses exponential smooth-
ing to when the retailer uses optimal forecasting and shares its demand shocks when α = .3 and
`2 = 0. This demonstrates that when the retailer uses exponential smoothing as opposed to the
retailer using optimal forecasting and sharing its demand shocks with the supplier, the supplier’s
expected cost can be more than 100 times higher. Figure 7 includes a similar graph compared to
Figure 6 except that in Figure 7, the retailer does not share its demand shocks. When φ ≤ −.5,
the supplier is unable to recover the retailer’s demand shocks (see Proposition 11) and hence, there
is less benefit to the supplier providing forecasting expertise to the retailer when the retailer will
not share its demand shocks.
In Figure 8, we provide a surface plot of the ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses
exponential smoothing to when the retailer uses optimal forecasting and shares its demand shocks
(when beneficial to the supplier) versus α and φ where the leadtime is 0. Figure 9 includes a
similar surface plot, except here, the leadtime is 6. These plots demonstrate that the supplier is
most benefited by sharing its forecasting expertise with the retailer when the retailer in return
shares its demand shocks with the supplier. It can be seen from Figures 8 and 9, that the ratio of
the supplier’s cost where the retailer uses exponential smoothing to where the retailer uses optimal
forecasting and shares its demand shocks (when beneficial to the supplier) is largest when the
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retailer’s sharing of its demand shocks is indeed beneficial to the supplier. In Proposition 11, we
show where the supplier is unable to recover the retailer’s demand shocks (i.e., the retailer’s order
to the supplier is not invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks).
4 Forecasting and Propagation Results
In this section, we provide theoretical results on the retailer’s order process based on its optimal
and suboptimal forecast of demand. We then derive the MSFE of the leadtime demand for both
the retailer and the supplier under the retailer’s optimal and suboptimal forecast. We also provide
sufficient conditions under which the supplier is able to infer the retailer’s demand shocks when the
retailer adopts the optimal forecasting method.
4.1 The Retailer
If the retailer uses exponential smoothing, its forecast of its AR(1) demand at time t+ 1 based on
information available at t denoted by DˆES1,t+1 is
DˆES1,t+1 = α
∞∑
k=1
(1− α)k−1D1,t+1−k (16)
where 0 < α < 1 is the smoothing parameter. The exponential smoothing method uses the present
and all past observations and assigns a weight for each observation, where the current observation
receives the highest weight. If the retailer’s true demand process is ARIMA(0, 1, 1), the exponential
smoothing forecast (with α = 1− θ, where θ is the moving average coefficient in the ARIMA(0,1,1)
model) is its best liner forecast at time t + 1. Since the retailer’s true demand process is AR(1),
the forecast generated by the exponential smoothing is not the best linear forecast.
Proposition 5 The retailer’s forecast over its leadtime based on the exponential smoothing method
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is given by
mES1,t =
`1+1∑
i=1
DˆES1,t+i = (`1 + 1)
[
α
1− (1− α)B
]
D1,t. (17)
Proofs of Proposition 5 as well as subsequent propositions are provided in the Appendix.
Below we show that the retailer’s order process is an ARMA(2,1) process.
Proposition 6 The retailer’s order based on the exponential smoothing method is ARMA(2,1) and
is given by
[1− (1− α)B] (1− φB)DES2,t = αd+ ES1,t −
(
1 + α`1
1 + α+ α`1
)
ES1,t−1 (18)
where ES1,t = (1 + α+ α`1)
true
1,t .
Remark 1 Since 0 < α < 1, the root of the polynomial θ(z) = 1 −
(
1+α`1
1+α+α`1
)
z is outside the
unit circle. Therefore, the retailer’s order to the supplier
{
DES2,t
}
is invertible with respect to the
retailer’s true demand shocks {true1,t }. In other words, the retailer’s current demand shock can be
obtained as a linear combination of the retailer’s present and past order observations. Therefore,
the supplier can recover the retailer’s true demand shocks and utilize them to forecast its leadtime
demand. Note that the roots of the polynomial φ(z) = [1− (1− α)z] (1 − φz) are both outside the
unit circle. Hence the retailer’s order process is causal.
Proposition 7 The retailer’s MSFE based on the exponential smoothing method is equal to
νES1 = E
(
l1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t
)2
=
∞∑
k=0
λ21,kσ
2
1 =
 `1∑
k=0
λ21,k +
∞∑
k=`1+1
λ21,k
σ21 (19)
where the λ1,k are defined in Equations (39), (40), and (41) in the Appendix, and
∑∞
k=`1+1
λ21,kσ
2
1
has an analytical expression.
On the other hand, if the supplier provides the retailer with forecasting expertise, the retailer
can forecast its AR(1) demand optimally. Under such circumstances, the retailer uses its best
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linear forecast of demand over the leadtime. We summarize the retailer’s forecast, order process,
and MSFE in the following propositions. These results follow from GHS (2014), and are included
to show the difference between optimal and suboptimal forecasting performance.
Proposition 8 The retailer’s best linear forecast of its demand over the leadtime is
mAR1,t = d
`1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
φj +
`1+1∑
k=1
φkD1,t.
The retailer’s order process based upon the best linear forecast {DAR2,t } is an ARMA(1, 1) process
(1− φB)DAR2,t = d+ AR,S1,t −
[
φ(1− φ`1+1)
1− φ`1+2
]
AR,S1,t−1 (20)
where AR,S1,t =
(
1−φ`1+2
1−φ
)
true1,t .
Remark 2 The retailer’s order process {DAR2,t } may not be invertible with respect to the retailer’s
true shocks, since the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) = 1−
[
φ(1−φ`1+1)
1−φ`1+2
]
z may be inside or outside the
unit circle, depending on the sign of the AR(1) coefficient φ and whether `1 is odd or even (see
Proposition 11).
Proposition 9 The MSFE based upon the retailer’s best linear forecast is given by
νAR1 = E
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mAR1,t
)2
=
`1∑
k=0
ω21,kσ
2
1 , (21)
where the ω1,k are defined in Equation (50) in the Appendix.
Remark 3 We note that the retailer’s MSFE under the correct AR(1) model only includes the
variance of demand shocks occurring during the forecasting period, while the MSFE under the
exponential smoothing forecast includes the variance of shocks occurring during the leadtime as well
as the infinite past.
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4.2 The Supplier
Unlike the retailer, the supplier always uses the best linear forecast of its leadtime demand. How-
ever, as shown above, the retailer’s order and hence the demand that the supplier must serve
depends upon the forecasting methodology used by the retailer.
If the retailer uses the exponential smoothing forecasting methodology, then the supplier faces
ARMA(2,1) demand, {DES2,t }. Next we provide a proposition describing the supplier’s best linear
forecast and its associated MSFE.
Proposition 10 If the retailer uses the exponential smoothing forecasting methodology, the sup-
plier’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime is
mES2,t =
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξESk 
ES
1,t+`2+1−k
and its associated MSFE is
νES2 = E
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DES2,t+i −mES2,t
)2
= [1 + α(1 + `1)]
2
`2∑
k=0
(ξESk )
2σ21 ,
where the ξESk are defined in Equation (60), (52), (53), and (54) in the Appendix.
If the retailer uses optimal forecasting, then if the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) = 1−
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z
is outside the unit circle, i.e.
∣∣∣ 1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
∣∣∣ > 1, the supplier’s demand is invertible with respect to
the retailer’s demand shocks {true1,t }. In other words, in such a case, the supplier can recover the
retailer’s demand shocks from the supplier’s own demand. On the other hand, if the root of the
polynomial θ˜(z) = 1−
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z is inside the unit circle, i.e.
∣∣∣ 1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
∣∣∣ < 1, the supplier’s demand
is not invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks {true1,t }. In such a case, the supplier
cannot recover the retailer’s demand shocks from the supplier’s own demand. However, the retailer
may or may not share its demand shocks with the supplier in such an instance. The propositions
below summarize the sufficient conditions under which the supplier’s demand is invertible with
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respect to the retailer’s demand shocks, and the supplier’s best linear forecast and its associated
MSFE under the retailer’s sharing and non-sharing of its demand shocks.
Proposition 11 Suppose the retailer’s demand is an AR(1) process with AR coefficient φ ∈
(−1, 1). If φ ∈ (0, 1), the supplier’s demand is always invertible with respect to the retailer’s
demand shocks {true1,t }. If φ ∈ (−1, 0), then
i) if `1 is odd, the supplier’s demand is invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks {true1,t }.
ii) if `1 is even, then there exists a constant κ(`1) ∈ (−1, 0) such that if φ ∈ (−1, κ(`1)), the sup-
plier’s demand is not invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks {true1,t }. If φ ∈ [κ(`1), 0),
the supplier’s demand is invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks {true1,t }.
Proposition 12 If the retailer uses optimal forecasting and the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) =
1 −
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z is outside the unit circle, or the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) = 1 −
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z is
inside the unit circle but the retailer shares its demand shocks with the supplier, the supplier’s best
linear forecast of its demand over the leadtime is given by
mAR,S2,t = (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξARk 
AR,S
1,t+`2+1−k
and its associated MSFE is
νAR,S2 = E
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i −mAR,S2,t
)2
=
(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)2 `2∑
k=0
(ξARk )
2σ21
where the ξARk are defined in Equations (63) and (64) in the Appendix.
Proposition 13 If the retailer uses optimal forecasting and the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) =
1−
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z is inside the unit circle and the retailer does not share its demand shocks with the
supplier, the supplier’s best linear forecast of its demand over the leadtime is given by
mAR,NS2,t = (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξ2,k ˜2,t+`2+1−k
18
where
˜2,t =
 1
1−
(
1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
)
B
 [(1− φB)DAR2,t − d]
and the MSFE of the supplier’s best linear forecast is equal to
νAR,NS2 = E
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i −mAR,NS2,t
)2
=
(
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ
)2 `2∑
k=0
(ξ2,k)
2σ21
where the ξ2,k are defined in Equations (69) and (70) in the Appendix.
5 Conclusion
Although it is common for firms to forecast stationary demand using simple exponential smoothing
due to the ease of computation and understanding of the methodology, we have shown that the costs
of doing so can be significant. Indeed, we have shown that a retailer using exponential smoothing
may have expected inventory related costs more than ten times higher than when compared to using
the optimal forecast. We demonstrated that when φ < α, the suppliers expected inventory related
cost is less when the retailer uses optimal forecasting as opposed to exponential smoothing. We
have also shown that there exists an additional set of cases where the sum of the expected inventory
related costs of the retailer and the supplier is less when the retailer uses optimal forecasting as
opposed to exponential smoothing even though the supplier’s expected costs are higher.
This research dovetails nicely with other information sharing papers as well. We demonstrated
that the supplier has most to gain by sharing its forecasting expertise with the retailer when the
retailer’s order to the supplier is not invertible with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks. Indeed,
we have shown that the the supplier’s expected cost where the retailer uses exponential smoothing
can be more than 100 times the supplier’s expected cost where the retailer uses optimal forecasting
and shares its demand shocks.
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Figure 1: Top: histogram of the retailer’s conditional service level Φ(r). Bottom: retailer’s condi-
tional expected inventory cost vs. conditional service level. The optimal service level, ss+h = .9 as
s = 9 and h = 1.
Figure 2: The ratio of the retailer’s expected cost when it uses exponential smoothing as opposed
to optimal forecasting versus φ. Here α = .45 and `1 = 6.
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Figure 3: Graph of α versus φ where `2 varies from 0 to 6. The red shaded region is where
EICES2 ≥ EICAR2 . The blue shaded region is where EICES2 < EICAR2 . It is clear that for most
values of α and φ, the supplier has a lower expected cost when the retailer uses optimal forecasting.
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Figure 4: Graph of α versus φ where `2 varies from 0 to 6. The red shaded region is where
TCES ≥ TCAR. The blue shaded region is where TCES < TCAR. It is clear that for most values
of α and φ, the chain has a lower expected cost when the retailer uses optimal forecasting.
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Figure 5: The green shaded region is where the supplier is better off under the retailer using optimal
forecasting and hence the chain as a whole is better off. The red shaded region is where the chain
as a whole is better off under the retailer using optimal forecasting although the supplier is better
off when the retailer uses exponential smoothing. The blue shaded region is where the chain is
worse off when the retailer uses optimal forecasting as opposed to exponential smoothing.
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Figure 6: The ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses exponential smoothing to when the
retailer uses optimal forecasting and shares its demand shocks when α = .3 and `2 = 0.
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Figure 7: The ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses exponential smoothing to when the
retailer uses optimal forecasting and does not share its demand shocks when α = .3 and `2 = 0.
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Figure 8: The ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses exponential smoothing to when the
retailer uses optimal forecasting and shares its demand shocks where `1 = `2 = 0.
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Figure 9: The ratio of the supplier’s cost when the retailer uses exponential smoothing to when the
retailer uses optimal forecasting and shares its demand shocks where `1 = `2 = 6.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let X =
∑l1+1
i=1 D1,t+i. Then the conditional distribution of X givenM1t is normal with mean m∗1,t
and variance ν∗1 . Let F be the CDF of this conditional distribution. The retailer’s conditional
expected cost under the optimal policy can be expressed as
s
∫ ∞
S∗1,t
(x− S∗1,t)dF (x)− h
∫ S∗1,t
−∞
(x− S∗1,t)dF (x). (22)
Let Z =
X−m∗1,t√
ν∗1
so that X − S∗1,t = X − m∗1,t − Φ−1
(
s
s+h
)√
ν∗1 =
√
ν∗1
(
Z − Φ−1
(
s
s+h
))
and
dF (X) = dΦ(Z). Thus, we can express (22) as
√
ν∗1 [s
∫ ∞
Φ−1( ss+h)
(
z − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
dΦ(z)− h
∫ Φ−1( ss+h)
−∞
(
z − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
dΦ(z)]. (23)
From Equation (9), note that
∫ x
−∞(z−x)dΦ(z) =
∫∞
−∞(z−x)dΦ(z)−L(x) = −x−L(x). Therefore,
Equation (23) becomes
√
ν∗1
[
(s+ h)L
(
Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
+ hΦ−1
(
s
s+ h
)]
(24)
which is the conditional expected cost of the retailer’s cost under the optimal policy (see Equation
4.7 in LST).
Proof of Proposition 3:
The retailer’s conditional expected cost under exponential smoothing can be expressed as
s
∫ ∞
SES1,t
(x− SES1,t )dF (x)|M1t )− h
∫ SES1,t
−∞
(x− SES1,t )dF (x)|M1t ). (25)
Since Z =
X−m∗1,t√
ν∗1
, it follows that
X − SES1,t = X −mES1,t − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1 =
√
ν∗1Z +m
∗
1,t −mES1,t − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1 . (26)
Therefore the retailer’s conditional expected cost is
√
ν∗1
[
s
∫ ∞
r
(z − r)dΦ(z)− h
∫ r
−∞
(z − r)dΦ(z)
]
. (27)
28
It follows that Equation (27) representing the retailer’s conditional expectation of cost under ex-
ponential smoothing is random and a function of r, where Φ(r) is the conditional expected service
level, which is also a random variable.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The retailer’s forecast error under the exponential smoothing is
l1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t =
∞∑
k=0
λ1,k
true
1,t+`1+1−k (28)
Let Y =
∑`1+1
i=1 Dt+i −mES1,t . Then the unconditional distribution of Y is normal with mean zero
and variance νES1 . The retailer’s unconditional expected cost under exponential smoothing can be
written as
E

(`1+1∑
i=1
Dt+i − SES1,t
)+
s+
(
`1+1∑
i=1
Dt+i − SES1,t
)−
h
 (29)
= E

(`1+1∑
i=1
Dt+i −mES1,t − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)+
s
+
(
`1+1∑
i=1
Dt+i −mES1,t − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)−
h

= E
[(
Y − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)+
s+
(
Y − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)−
h
]
(30)
which can also be expressed as
s
∫ ∞
Φ−1( ss+h)
√
νES1
(
y − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)
dG(y)
− h
∫ Φ−1( ss+h)√νES1
−∞
(
y − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
)√
νES1
)
dG(y) (31)
where G(·) is the CDF of Y.
Let Z = Y√
νES1
=
∑`1+1
i=1 D1,t+i−mES1,t√
νES1
so that Y = Z
√
νES1 and dG(Y ) = dΦ(Z). After the transfor-
mation of Y , Equation (31) becomes√
νES1
[
s
∫ ∞
Φ−1( ss+h)
(
z − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
dΦ(z)− h
∫ Φ−1( ss+h)
−∞
(
z − Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
dΦ(z)
]
(32)
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note that
∫ x
−∞(z − x)dφ(z) =
∫∞
−∞(z − x)dφ(z) − L(x) = −x − L(x). Therefore, Equation (32) is
equal to √
νES1
[
(s+ h)L
(
Φ−1
(
s
s+ h
))
+ hΦ−1(
s
s+ h
)
]
. (33)
Proof of Proposition 5.
Define Λ(B) = 1 + (1−α)B + (1−α)2B2 + (1−α)3B3 + . . . = α1−(1−α)B , where B is the backshift
operator such that BD1,t = D1,t−1. Then equation (16) can be represented as
DˆES1,t+1 = αΛ(B)D1,t =
[
α
1− (1− α)B
]
D1,t (34)
The h-steps ahead forecast of the retailer’s demand based on retailer’s available information set at
time tM1t , DˆESt+h, is the same as DˆESt+1. Therefore, the linear forecast of the future demand during
the replenishment period `1 can be expressed as
mES1,t =
`1+1∑
i=1
DˆES1,t+i = (`1 + 1)Dˆ
ES
1,t+1 = (`1 + 1)
[
α
1− (1− α)B
]
D1,t. (35)
2
Proof of Proposition 6:
Let D˜1,t = D1,t − µd be the demeaned demand process, where µd = E [D1,t] = d1−φ . Then
D˜1,t = (1− φB)−1true1,t (36)
and
mES1,t = (`1 + 1)αΛ(B)D˜1,t + (1 + `1)µd. (37)
Using the results from Equations (36) and (37), one can represent the retailer’s order with respect
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to the retailer’s true demand shocks as
DES2,t = D1,t + (1−B)mES1,t
= µd + [1 + (1−B)αΛ(B)(1 + `1)] D˜1,t
= µd +
(1−B)(1 + α`1) + α
[1− (1− α)B] (1− φB)
true
1,t . (38)
Applying the operator [1− (1− α)B] (1− φB) to both sides of (38), it follows that
[1− (1− α)B] (1− φB)DES2,t = αd+ [α+ (1−B)(1 + α`1)] true1,t .
Let ES1,t = (1 + α+ α`1)
true
1,t . Then Equation (38) can be expressed as
[1− (1− α)B] (1− φB)DES2,t = αd+ ES1,t −
(
1 + α`1
1 + α+ α`1
)
ES1,t−1.
2
Lemma 1 The retailer’s forecast errors over the leadtime under the suboptimal forecast are equal
to
l1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t =
∞∑
k=0
λ1,k
true
1,t+`1+1−k
where
λ1,k =

1 : k = 0
λ1,k−1 + φk : 0 < k ≤ `1∑`1+1
s=1 ψs,s+k−`1−1 : k > `1
(39)
with
ψi,j =

φj : 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1(
φi − αφα+φ−1
)
φj−i − α(α−1)α+φ−1 (1− α)j−i : i ≤ j
(40)
if α+ φ 6= 1
and
ψi,j =

φj : 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1[
φi − α(j − i+ 1)]φj−i : i ≤ j (41)
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if α+ φ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
The retailer’s forecast errors over the leadtime are
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t =
`1+1∑
i=1
[
D1,t+i −
mES1,t
1 + `1
]
=
`1+1∑
i=1
[
D˜1,t+i + µd −
mES1,t
1 + `1
]
(42)
Using the expression for mES1,t from Equation (37), the retailer’s forecast error at t + i can be
expressed as
D1,t+i −
mES1,t
1 + `1
= D˜1,t+i + µd −
mES1,t
1 + `1
=
[
D˜1,t+i − αΛ(B)D˜1,t
]
=
φiD˜1,t + i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
− αΛ(B)D˜1,t
=
[
φi − αΛ(B)] D˜1,t + i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
=
[
φi − α
1− (1− α)B
]
(1− φB)−1true1,t +
i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j .
Case I: α+ φ 6= 1.
If α+ φ 6= 1, one can apply partial fractions to represent
[
φi − α
1− (1− α)B
]
(1− φB)−1true1,t =
{
φi
1− φB − α
[
Γ1
1− (1− α)B +
Γ2
1− φB
]}
true1,t
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where Γ1 =
α−1
α+φ−1 and Γ2 =
φ
α+φ−1 . Hence
D1,t+i −
mES1,t
1 + `1
=
φi ∞∑
j=0
φjBj − αΓ1
∞∑
j=0
(1− α)jBj − αΓ2
∞∑
j=0
φjBj
 true1,t
+
i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
=
∞∑
j=0
[(
φi − αΓ2
)
φj − αΓ1(1− α)j
]
true1,t−j +
i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
≡
∞∑
j=0
ψi,j
true
1,t+i−j
where
ψi,j =

φj : 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1(
φi − αφα+φ−1
)
φj−i − α(1−α)α+φ−1 (1− α)j−i : i ≤ j
Case II: α+ φ = 1.
If α+ φ = 1, then 1− α = φ. The retailer’s forecast error at t+ i can be expressed as
D1,t+i −
mES1,t
1 + `1
=
[
φi − α
1− φB
]
(1− φB)−1true1,t +
i−1∑
j=0
φjtruet+i−j
=
[
φi
1− φB −
α
(1− φB)2
]
true1,t +
i−1∑
j=0
φjtruet+i−j
=
φi ∞∑
j=0
φjBj − α
∞∑
j=0
(j + 1)φjBj
 true1,t + i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
=
∞∑
j=0
[
φi − α(j + 1)]φjtrue1,t−j + i−1∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j
≡
∞∑
j=0
ψi,j
true
1,t+i−j
where
ψi,j =

φj : 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1[
φi − α(j − i+ 1)]φj−i : i ≤ j
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The retailer’s forecast errors over the leadtime are then equal to
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t =
`1+1∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
ψi,j
true
1,t+i−j (43)
=
∞∑
k=0
λ1,k
true
1,t+`1+1−k (44)
where
λ1,k =

1 : k = 0
λ1,k−1 + φk : 0 < k ≤ `1∑`1+1
s=1 ψs,s+k−`1−1 : k > `1
with ψs,s+k−`1−1 defined based on the sum of α and φ. 2
Proof of Proposition 7:
From Equation (44) in Lemma 5, it follows directly that the retailer’s MSFE is equal to
νES1 = E
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mES1,t
)2
=
∞∑
k=0
λ21,kσ
2
1
=
 `1∑
k=0
λ21,k +
∞∑
k=`1+1
λ21,k
σ21 .
The analytical expression for
∑∞
k=`1+1
λ21,k is dependent on the sum of α and φ. First we consider
the case when α + φ 6= 1. We define Θ(i) = φi − αΓ2. Together with the definition for ψi,j from
equation (40) when i ≤ j, we can express
λ1,`1+1 =
`1+1∑
s=1
ψs,s =
`1+1∑
s=1
Θ(s)−
`1+1∑
s=1
αΓ1 =
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ − (`1 + 1)αΓ2 − (`1 + 1)αΓ1.
For any q ≥ 1,
λ1,`1+q =
`1+1∑
s=1
ψs,s+q−1 = φq−1
[
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ − (`1 + 1)αΓ2
]
− (1− α)q−1 (`1 + 1)αΓ1.
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Define Γ3 =
[
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ − (`1 + 1)αΓ2
]
and Γ4 = (`1 + 1)αΓ1. Then
∞∑
k=`1+1
λ21,k =
∞∑
q=1
[
φq−1Γ3 − (1− α)q−1Γ4
]2
=
∞∑
q=0
[φqΓ3 − (1− α)qΓ4]2
= Γ23
∞∑
q=0
φ2q − 2Γ3Γ4
∞∑
q=0
[φ(1− α)]q + Γ24
∞∑
q=0
(1− α)2q
=
Γ23
1− φ2 − 2Γ3Γ4
[
1
1− φ(1− α)
]
+
Γ24
1− (1− α)2 .
One can apply a similar approach to find an analytical expression for
∑∞
k=`1+1
λ21,k when α+φ = 1.
For any q ≥ 1,
λ1,`1+q =
`1+q∑
s=1
ψs,s+q−1 = φq−1
`1+1∑
s=1
(φs − αq) = φq−1
[
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ − α(1 + `1)q
]
.
Define Γ5 =
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ . Then
∞∑
k=`1+1
λ21,k =
∞∑
q=1
φ2(q−1)
[
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ − α(1 + `1)q
]2
=
Γ25
1− φ2 −
2α(1 + `1)Γ5
(1− φ2)2 +
α2(`1 + 1)
2(1 + φ2)
(1− φ2)3 ,
2
Proof of Proposition 8:
The retailer’s k-step ahead forecast of demand given the available information at t is given by
DˆAR1,t+k = d
k−1∑
j=0
φj + φkD1,t. (45)
Therefore, the retailer’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime is
mAR1,t =
`1+1∑
k=1
DˆAR1,t+k = d
`1+1∑
k=1
k−1∑
j=0
φj +
`1+1∑
k=1
φkD1,t = d
`1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
φj +
`1+1∑
k=1
φkD1,t.
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One can further show that
mAR1,t −mAR1,t−1 = φ
[
1− φ`1+1
1− φ
]
(1−B)D1,t
Hence the retailer’s order process under the optimal forecast is
DAR2,t = D1,t +m
AR
1,t −mAR1,t−1
= µd +
1 + φ
(
1−φ`1+1
1−φ
)
(1−B)
1− φB
 true1,t . (46)
Applying 1− φB to both sides of the above equation, it follows that
(1− φB)DAR2,t = d+
[
1 + φ
(
1− φ`1+1
1− φ
)
(1−B)
]
true1,t
= d+
1 + (1−B) `1+1∑
j=1
φj
 true1,t . (47)
Rescaling the RHS of Equation (47) so that the leading MA coefficient is one, one obtains the
retailer’s order process
(1− φB)DAR2,t = d+ AR,S1,t −
[
φ(1− φ`1+1)
1− φ`1+2
]
AR,S1,t−1 (48)
where AR,S1,t =
(
1−φ`1+2
1−φ
)
true1,t . 2
Proof of Proposition 9:
The retailer’s demand has an MA(∞) representation with respect to its demand shocks
D1,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t−j .
Its demand over the leadtime can be expressed as
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i = (`1 + 1)µd +
`1+1∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
φjtrue1,t+i−j = (`1 + 1)µd +
∞∑
k=0
ω1,k
true
t+`1+1−k (49)
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where
ω1,k =

1 : k = 0
ω1,k−1 + φk : 0 < k ≤ `1
φω1,k−1 : k > `1
(50)
Hence the retailer’s best linear forecast of demand over the leadtime given information available at
t is equal to
mAR1,t = E
[
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i|M1t
]
= (`1 + 1)µd +
∞∑
k=`1+1
ω1,k
true
1,t+`1+1−k
and its forecast error is
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mAR1,t =
`1∑
k=0
ω1,k
true
t+`1+1−k.
The MSFE of the retailer’s best linear forecast is then given by
νAR1 = E
(
`1+1∑
i=1
D1,t+i −mAR1,t
)2
=
`1∑
k=0
ω21,kσ
2
1 .
2
Lemma 2 The supplier’s demand under the suboptimal forecast has an MA(∞) representation
with respect to the retailer’s demand shocks of
DES2,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψESj 
ES
1,t−j (51)
where ES1,t−j = [1 + α(1 + `1)]
true
1,t−j and
ψESj =
(1− α)j(α2 + α2`1)
(α+ φ− 1)(1 + α+ α`1) +
φj [φ(1 + α+ αφ)− (1 + α`1)]
(α+ φ− 1)(1 + α+ α`1) , ∀j = 0, 1, 2, · · · (52)
if α+ φ 6= 1 and φ 6= 0
ψESj =

(1− α)j − (1+α`1)(1−α)j−11+α+α`1 + 1+α`1(1−α)(1+α+α`1) : j = 0
(1− α)j − (1+α`1)(1−α)j−11+α+α`1 : j > 0
(53)
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if α+ φ 6= 1 and φ = 0
and
ψESj = φ
j(1 + j)− j(1 + α`1)φ
j−1
1 + α+ α`1
, ∀j = 0, 1, · · · (54)
if α+ φ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Equation (38) can be expressed as
DES2,t = µd +
(1 + α(1 + `1)− (1 + α`1)B
[1− (1− α)B](1− φB) 
true
1,t .
Define G(B) = 1+α(1+`1)−(1+α`1)B[1−(1−α)B](1−φB) , a rational polynomial with the degree of the numerator less than
the degree of the denominator. G(B) has different forms of partial fractional expression depending
on the sum of α and φ and whether value of φ is zero. We consider three cases: (i) α+ φ 6= 1 and
φ 6= 0, (ii) α+ φ = 1 and φ = 0, and (iii) α+ φ = 1.
Case I: α+ φ 6= 1 and φ 6= 0.
One can express G(B) as
G(B) = [1 + α(1 + `1)− (1 + α`1)B]
[
Γ1
1− (1− α)B +
Γ2
1− φB
]
(55)
where
Γ1
1− 1(1− α)B +
Γ2
1− φB =
1
[1− (1− α)B] (1− φB) .
Solving the equation, we obtain Γ1 =
α−1
α+φ−1 and Γ2 =
φ
α+φ−1 . Equation (55) then can be expressed
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as
G(B) = [1 + α(1 + `1)− (1 + α`1)B]
[
Γ1
1− (1− α)B +
Γ2
1− φB
]
=
∞∑
j=0
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ1(1− α)j + [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ2φj
}
Bj
−
∞∑
j=0
[(1 + α`1)Γ1(1− α)j + (1 + α`1)Γ2φj ]Bj+1
=
∞∑
j=0
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ1(1− α)j + [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ2φj
}
Bj
−
∞∑
j=1
[(1 + α`1)Γ1(1− α)j−1 + (1 + α`1)Γ2φj−1]Bj
=
∞∑
j=0
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ1(1− α)j + [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ2φj
}
Bj
−
∞∑
j=0
[(1 + α`1)Γ1(1− α)j−1 + (1 + α`1)Γ2φj−1]Bj
+
(1 + α`1)Γ1
1− α +
(1 + α`1)Γ2
φ
=
∞∑
j=0
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ1(1− α)j + [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ2φj
− (1 + α`1)Γ1(1− α)j−1 − (1 + α`1)Γ2φj−1
}
Bj .
Note that φ ∈ (−1, 1), φ may be equal to zero. If φ 6= 0, then (1+α`1)Γ11−α + (1+α`1)Γ2φ = 0 since its
numerator (1 + α`1)Γ1φ + (1 + α`1)Γ2(1 − α) = 0. Therefore, DES2,t has a MA(∞) representation
with respect to {true1,t }
DES2,t = µd +G(B)
true
1,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψ˜ESj 
true
1,t−j . (56)
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where
ψ˜ESj = [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ1(1− α)j + [1 + α(1 + `1)]Γ2φj − (1 + α`1)Γ1(1− α)j−1 − (1 + α`1)Γ2φj−1
=
(1− α)j(α2 + α2`1)
α+ φ− 1 +
φj [φ(1 + α+ αφ)− (1 + α`1)]
α+ φ− 1
∀j = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
Case II: α+ φ 6= 1 and φ = 0.
Since φ = 0, one can express G(B) as
G(B) =
∞∑
j=0
[1 + α(1 + `1)] (1− α)jBj −
∞∑
j=0
(1 + α`1)(1− α)j−1Bj + 1 + α`1
1− α
=
∞∑
j=1
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)] (1− α)j − (1 + α`1)(1− α)j−1
}
Bj +
1 + α`1
1− α
and the coefficients in the MA(∞) representation of DES2,t are given by
ψ˜ESj =

[1 + α(1 + `1)] (1− α)j − (1 + α`1)(1− α)j−1 + 1+α`11−α : j = 0
[1 + α(1 + `1)] (1− α)j − (1 + α`1)(1− α)j−1 : j > 0
(57)
Case III: α+ φ = 1.
If α+ φ = 1, then (55) can be expressed as
G(B) = [1 + α(1 + `1)− (1 + α`1)B] 1
(1− φB)2
= [1 + α(1 + `1)− (1 + α`1)B]
∞∑
j=0
(j + 1)φjBj
= [1 + α(1 + `1)]
∞∑
j=0
(1 + j)φjBj −
∞∑
j=0
(1 + α`1)(j + 1)φ
jBj+1
=
∞∑
j=0
{
[1 + α(1 + `1)](1 + j)φ
j − (1 + α`1)jφj−1
}
Bj
The coefficients in the MA(∞) representation of DES2,t are given by
ψ˜ESj = φ
j−1 {[1 + α(1 + `1)]φ(1 + j)− j(1 + α`1)} , ∀j = 0, 1, · · · (58)
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When j = 0, the three representations of G(B) all have ψ˜ES0 = 1+α+α`1. Let 
ES
1,t−j = ψ˜
ES
0 
true
1,t−j =
[1 + α(1 + `1)]
true
1,t−j and ψ
ES
j =
ψ˜ESj
ψ˜ES0
.
Then (56) can be represented as
DES2,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
(
ψ˜ESj
ψ˜ES0
)
ψ˜ES0 
true
1,t−j = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψESj 
ES
1,t−j . (59)
Proof of Proposition 10:
Following Equation (51) in Lemma 2, the supplier’s demand over the leadtime `2 + 1 is
`2+1∑
i=1
DES2,t+i = (1 + `2)µd +
`2+1∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
ψESj 
ES
1,t+i−j
= (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=0
ξESk 
ES
t+`2+1−k
where
ξESk =

1 : k = 0
ξESk−1 + ψ
ES
k : 0 < k ≤ `2
ξESk−1 + ψ
ES
k − ψESk−`2−1 : k > `2
(60)
Since the shocks
{
ES1,t+l2+1, 
ES
1,t+l2
, · · · , ES1,t+1
}
are not predictable at time t, their conditional expec-
tations are zero. Therefore, the supplier’s best linear forecast of future demand over the leadtime
is equal to
mES2,t = E
[
`2+1∑
i=1
DES2,t+i|M2t
]
= (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξESk 
ES
1,t+`2+1−k.
The supplier’s MSFE is
νES2 = Var
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DES2,t+i −mES2,t
)
= [1 + α(1 + `1)]
2
`2∑
k=0
(ξESk )
2σ21 .
Proof of Proposition 11:
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If the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) = 1−
[
φ(1−φ`1+1)
1−φ`1+2
]
z is inside the unit circle, i.e.
∣∣∣ 1−φ`1+2
φ(1−φ`1+1)
∣∣∣ < 1,
then the supplier’s demand {DAR2,t } is not invertible with respect to the retailer’s shocks {true1,t }.
The inequality implies
−1 < 1− φ
`1+2
φ(1− φ`1+1) < 1. (61)
When 0 < φ < 1, the righthand side of (61) is not satisfied. When −1 < φ < 0, to satisfy both
sides of (61), φ must be less than one and satisfy
2φ`1+2 − φ > 1. (62)
If `1 is odd, we have
2φ`1+2 − φ = |φ| − 2|φ`1+2| < |φ| < 1
which conflicts with (62) and thus the supplier’s demand is invertible with respect to the retailer’s
demand shocks {true1,t }. This establishes the proof of (i).
Next we show the root of the polynomial
f(φ) = 2φ`1+2 − φ− 1
is a function of `1 when `1 is even. Lemma 3 shows f(φ) is a square-free polynomial. Hence we can
apply Sturm’s theorem to identify the intervals where the roots of f(φ) are located. From Sturm’s
theorem, the number of sign changes in the Sturm chain at φ = −1 and φ = 0 are two and one
respectively. Hence there is exactly one root between −1 and 0. Let φ = κ(`1) be the root of f(φ),
where κ(`1) ∈ (−1, 0) and `1 is even. Since f(0) < 0 and f(−1) > 0 when `1 is even, we infer that
for φ ∈ (−1, κ(`1)), f(φ) > 0, and φ ∈ (κ(`1), 0), f(φ) < 0. This establishes the proof of (ii). 2
Lemma 3 The polynomial f(x) = 2x`1+2 − x− 1 is a square-free polynomial.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Assume x = a is a root of f(x). We can write f(x) = (x− a)q(x). If we take the first derivative of
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f(x), then f ′(x) = q(x) + (x − a)q′(x). If f(x) has a repeating root such as x = a, then q(x) can
be factorized as q(x) = (x− a)γ(x). This implies that f ′(x) shares the common factor (x− a) with
f(x). Therefore, a sufficient condition for f(x) to be a square free polynomial is that the greatest
common divisor (GCD) of f(x) and f ′(x) is a constant. One can apply the Euclidean Algorithm
to find the GCD of f(x) and f ′(x). Using the polynomial long division, we can express
f(x) = f ′(x)
x
`1 + 2
−
(
`1 + 1
`1 + 2
)
x− 1.
Repeating the polynomial long division for f ′(x) with respect to −
(
`1+1
`1+2
)
x− 1, we can express
f ′(x) =
[
−
(
`1 + 1
`1 + 2
)
x− 1
]
p(x) + C(`1)
where p(x) is a polynomial whose degree is less than the degree of f ′(x) and C(`1) is a constant
with value depending on `1. Applying the polynomial long division again for
[
−
(
`1+1
`1+2
)
x− 1
]
with
respect to C(`1), we have the remainder equal to zero. Thus we conclude that the GCD of f(x)
and f ′(x) is the constant C(`1). 2
Lemma 4 The supplier’s demand process under the optimal forecast has the MA(∞) representation
with respect to {true1,t−j}
DAR2,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψARj 
AR,S
1,t−j ,
where
ψARj =

1 : j = 0
(1−φ)φ`1+j+1
1−φ`1+2 : j ≥ 1
(63)
Proof of Lemma 4:
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Using Equation (46), one can express the supplier’s demand under the optimal forecast as
DAR2,t = µd +
(
1 + φ
1− φ`1+1
1− φ
)
true1,t +
∞∑
j=0
φ`1+2+jtrue1,t−1−j
= µd +
(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)
true1,t +
∞∑
j=0
φ`1+2+jtrue1,t−1−j
= µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψ˜ARj 
true
1,t−j
where
ψ˜ARj =

(
1 +
∑`1+1
k=1 φ
k
)
: j = 0
φ`1+1+j : j ≥ 1
Let ψARj =
ψ˜ARj
ψ˜AR0
and AR,S1,t−j = ψ˜
AR
0 
true
1,t−j . Then
DAR2,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψARj 
AR,S
1,t−j
where
ψARj =

1 : j = 0
(1−φ)φ`1+j+1
1−φ`1+2 : j ≥ 1
2
Proof of Proposition 12:
Following Lemma 4, the supplier’s demand over the leadtime periods `2 + 1 can be expressed as
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i = (`2 + 1)µd +
`2+1∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
ψARj 
true
1,t+i−j = (`2 + 1)µd +
∞∑
k=0
ξARk 
true
1,t+`2+1−k
where
ξARk =

1 :
ξARk−1 + ψ
AR
k : 0 < k ≤ `2
ξARk−1 + ψ
AR
k − ψARk−`2−1 : k > `2
(64)
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Hence the supplier’s best linear forecast of future demand over leadtime is equal to
mAR,S2,t = E
[
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i|M2t
]
= (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξARk 
true
1,t+`2+1−k
and the supplier’s MSFE is
νAR,S2 = E
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i −mAR,S2,t
)2
=
`2∑
k=0
(ξARk )
2σ21
2
Lemma 5 If the retailer uses optimal forecasting and the root of the polynomial θ˜(z) = 1 −(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)
z is inside the unit circle and the retailer does not share its demand shocks with the
supplier, the supplier’s demand is equal to
DAR2,t = µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψ2,j ˜2,t−j (65)
where
ψ2,j =

1 : j = 0
φj−2(1−φ)(φ`1+2−φ−1)
1−φ`1+1 : j ≥ 1
(66)
and
˜2,t−j =
 1
1−
(
1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
)
B
 [(1− φB)DAR2,t − d] .
Proof of Lemma 5:
When the retailer adopts the optimal forecast, the supplier faces ARMA(1,1) demand specified by
Equation (47)
(1− φB)DAR2,t = d+
1 + `1+1∑
j=1
φj(1−B)
 true1,t
= d+
1 + `1+1∑
j=1
φj
[1−( ∑`1+1j=1 φj
1 +
∑`1+1
j=1 φ
j
)
B
]
true1,t . (67)
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Since the retailer’s shocks are not invertible with respect to {true1,t } and the retailer does not
share {true1,t } with the supplier, the supplier will construct a new ARMA(1,1) representation for
its demand with respect to a set of shocks which generates the same linear past as its observed
demand (see Brockwell and Davis 1991, pp.125 - 126). Thus Equation (67) becomes
(1− φB)DAR2,t = d+
1 + `1+1∑
j=1
φj
[1−(1 +∑`1+1j=1 φj∑`1+1
j=1 φ
j
)
B
]
2,t
= d+
(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)[
1−
(
1− φ`1+2
φ− φ`1+2
)
B
]
2,t (68)
where
2,t =
(
1− φ
1− φ`1+2
) 1
1−
(
1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
)
B
 [(1− φB)DAR2,t − d] .
Hence the supplier’s demand from Equation (68) can be expressed as
DAR2,t = µd +
(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)
2,t +
∞∑
j=1
[(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)
φj −
[
(1− φ`1+2)2
(1− φ)(φ− φ`1+2)
]
φj−1
]
2,t−j
= µd +
∞∑
j=0
ψ2,j ˜2,t−j
where
ψ2,j =

1 : j = 0
φj−2(1−φ)(φ`1+2−φ−1)
1−φ`1+1 : j ≥ 1
(69)
and ˜2,t−j =
(
1−φ`1+2
1−φ
)
2,t. 2
Proof of Proposition 13:
Using Equation (65) from Lemma 5, the Supplier’s demand over the leadtime can be expressed as
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i = (`2 + 1)µd +
`2+1∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
ψ2,j ˜2,t+i−j = (`2 + 1)µd +
∞∑
k=0
ξ2,k ˜2,t+`2+1−k
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where
ξ2,k =

1 : k = 0
ξ2,k−1 + ψ2,k : 0 < k ≤ `2
ξk−1 + ψ2,k − ψ2,k−`2−1 : k > `2
(70)
The supplier’s best linear forecast of its demand over the leadtime `2 + 1 is
mAR,NS2,t = (1 + `2)µd +
∞∑
k=`2+1
ξ2,k ˜2,t+`2+1−k.
It is straightforward to show that the supplier’s MSFE is equal to
νAR,NS2 = E
(
`2+1∑
i=1
DAR2,t+i −mAR,NS2,t
)2
=
(
1− φ`1+2
1− φ
)2 `2∑
k=0
(ξ2,k)
2σ22 =
(
φ− φ`1+2
1− φ
)2 `2∑
k=0
(ξ2,k)
2σ21
(71)
where σ22 is the variance of the supplier’s demand shocks {2,t} and σ22 =
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)2
σ21 . 2
Remark 4 The condition under which the root is inside the unit circle,
∣∣∣ 1−φ`1+2
φ−φ`1+2
∣∣∣ < 1, implies
σ22 =
(
φ−φ`1+2
1−φ`1+2
)2
σ21 > σ
2
1.
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